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Ectogenesis, or the use of artificial wombs to allow a foetus to develop, will likely become a 
reality within a few decades, and could significantly affect the abortion debate. We first 
examine the implications for Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, which argues for a 
woman’s right to withdraw life support from the foetus and so terminate her pregnancy, even 
if the foetus is granted full moral status. We show that on Thomson’s reasoning, there is no 
right to the death of the foetus, and abortion is not permissible if ectogenesis is available, 
provided it is safe and inexpensive. This raises the question of whether there are persuasive 
reasons for the right to the death of the foetus that could be exercised in the context of 
ectogenesis. Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis have examined several arguments for this right, 
doubting that it exists, while Joona Räsänen has recently criticized their reasoning. We 
respond to Räsänen’s analysis, concluding that his arguments are unsuccessful, and that there 




Ectogenesis describes the artificial means of supporting and growing an organism outside of 
its mother’s body, during the period it would normally reside within her uterus. Although 
developing this technology is a complex endeavour, considerable progress has been made in 
the development of artificial environments for animal foetuses , and it has been reported that 1
one researcher has succeeded in cultivating human embryos in an artificial womb for up to 
ten days . Given ectogenesis’ application in the treatment of premature neonates, there is an 2
incentive to continue development, and it also promises to bypass some of the ethical issues 
associated with surrogacy. Ectogenesis will also give women the opportunity to avoid the 
inherent risks of pregnancy and childbirth . Progress is slow, but there is reason to believe 3
that at some point in the future ectogenesis will become a reality.  
 
Ectogenesis will have a far-reaching impact on the abortion debate. Mary Anne Warren 
writes that ‘birth is morally significant because it marks the end of one relationship and the 
beginning of others. It marks the end of pregnancy, a relationship so intimate that it is 
impossible to extend the equal protection of the law to foetuses without severely infringing 
women's most basic rights’ . Provided the technology encompasses the ability to safely 4
extract an embryo or foetus from a pregnant woman, something we will assume in what 
follows, ectogenesis will enable this special relationship to be severed without killing the 
foetus. Any arguments for abortion that rely on the right to bodily autonomy or self defence 
will be impacted, shifting the debate to the question of whether there is a right to the death of 
the foetus. If there is not, then abortion is impermissible, given ectogenesis offers an 
alternative that allows the foetus to live.  
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An important factor in this debate is the moral status of the extracted foetus. Something that 
possesses moral status is ‘an entity towards which moral agents have, or can have, moral 
obligations … we may not treat it in just any way we please’ . For example, if it is morally 5
bad for an animal to suffer, it enjoys a degree of moral status. As Joona Räsänen  has noted, 6
if the foetus has no moral status at all, then no argument need be made. Ectogenesis and 
ending the life of the extracted foetus would be little different to cutting one’s hair and 
discarding it. Conversely, if the extracted foetus is considered to have full moral status 
equivalent to that of an adult, then this implies the foetus has a right to life, and it is likely to 
be difficult to justify a right to its death. Many ethicists such as Jeff McMahan and Warren 
hold to a position between these extremes: while unwilling to grant full moral status to the 
foetus, they believe it nevertheless possesses partial moral status. This means that although 
the foetus has no right to life, ‘we are morally obliged to give weight in our deliberations to 
its needs, interests or well-being’ . 7
 
We begin by considering how the most widely debated argument for abortion is impacted by 
ectogenesis: Judith Jarvis Thomson’s well known violinist analogy . Currently, if her 8
reasoning is accepted, it establishes abortion as permissible even if the foetus is granted full 
moral status, one of the few arguments to do so, and certainly the most important one. If 
Thomson’s argument fails to establish a right to the death of the foetus, then we must look to 
other reasons. 
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Press, p. 3. 
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Recently, Christine Overall  presented several arguments for the right to the death of the 9
foetus. Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis  have subsequently examined and rejected three of 10
the most plausible arguments for this right, and Räsänen  has responded with a detailed 11
reply.  
 
A prerequisite for discussion is an understanding of what is meant by a ​right​ so that we can 
determine what is required to establish it. Mathison and Davis clarify that they are referring 
to an interest-based account of rights: 'a right is a significant interest that confers upon its 
possessor the power to make claims on others to respect or protect it’ . To merely have an 12
interest is not enough: the interest must be ​significant​. According to Joseph Raz’s prominent 
account,  'an interest is sufficient to base a right on if and only if there is a sound argument of 
which the conclusion is that a certain right exists' .  Raz requires 'grounds for attributing to it 13
the required importance' , together with reasons that demonstrate ‘these grounds are not 14
altogether outweighed by conflicting reasons’ . Here, we reply to Räsänen, judging that his 15
arguments do not provide sufficient grounds capable of overriding reasons not to kill the 
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Thomson’s violinist argument for abortion   is based on a thought experiment that constructs 16
an analogy to pregnancy: a famous unconscious violinist who, while you were sleeping, has 
been attached to your body because you are the only person with the blood type who can help 
him recover from his kidney ailment. You are told that you cannot unplug yourself from him, 
because he has a right to life, and after all, it is only for nine months. After that period he will 
have recovered. Thomson appeals to our intuition that this would be an outrageous situation, 
and states that ‘a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or 
a right to be allowed continued use of another person’s body ’. In Thomson’s view, ‘no-one 17
is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, of all other interests and concerns, of 
all other duties and commitments, for nine years, or even for nine months, in order to keep 
another person alive’ . Thomson sees the woman who carries her foetus to full-term as a 18
‘Good Samaritan’ who ​voluntarily​ goes beyond what is morally required of her.  
 
We do not intend to enter the ongoing debate as to whether Thomson succeeds in justifying 
abortion. Our interest here is how ectogenesis will impact her argument. It is crucial to note 
that Thomson does not advocate the ​death​ of the foetus, but rather its ​removal​. For Thomson, 
abortion is a means to terminate pregnancy, not the life of the foetus, although currently, 
terminating pregnancy will inevitably result in its death. She writes that ‘the desire for the 
child’s death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach 
the child alive’ . Thomson does not believe there is a right to the death of the foetus; indeed, 19
she is clear that in the case of the violinist ‘you have no right to be guaranteed his death, by 
16 ​Thomson, ​op. cit.​ note 8, pp. 48-49. 
17 Ibid: 56. 
18 Ibid: 64. 
19 Ibid: 66. 
some other means, if unplugging yourself does not kill him’ .  As I. Glenn Cohen notes with 20
regard to Thomson, ‘the right enjoyed by women is a right to stop gestating, not a right to end 
the existence of the fetus’ , while David Boonin summarises her argument as ‘the right to 21
life does not include or entail the right to life support’ . In the case of pregnancy, this life 22
support is provided by the foetus’s mother, and so she is entitled to withdraw that support by 
the only means possible: aborting the foetus.  
 
Ectogenesis severs the link between termination of pregnancy and the death of the foetus. 
Provided ectogenesis is safe, which we have assumed, and affordable, the mother can 
withdraw the life support she is providing without harming the foetus, and without a ‘Good 
Samaritan’ sacrifice being required of her. Instead, the foetus’s life support can be supplied 
by an artificial womb that we are assuming is not a burden on its parents, financially or 
otherwise. How safe and affordable compared to abortion must ectogenesis be to avoid being 
a ‘Good Samaritan’ sacrifice? We agree with McMahan that it can be allowed that 
ectogenesis can be significantly worse than abortion, but not substantially worse: ‘she is 
morally required to accept ​some​ costs in order to remove it alive rather than to kill it’ . 23
Provided these costs are not substantially worse, and recalling that Thomson grants the foetus 
full moral status, abortion is not permissible and ectogenesis must be utilised if the pregnancy 
is to be ended. As McMahan states, ‘it is simply not plausible to suppose that she may 
permissibly kill her own child rather than remove it alive, even at somewhat greater cost to 
herself’ . 24
20 Thomson, ​op. cit.​ note 8, p. 66. 
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THE RIGHT TO THE DEATH OF THE FOETUS 
 
We have shown that according to Thomson’s reasoning, there is no right to the death of the 
foetus, and so if ectogenesis is available, we are morally obliged to utilise it for unwanted 
pregnancies rather than aborting the foetus. If we grant the foetus full moral status, it is then 
difficult to envisage ​any​ situation where a right to its death could be justified. This is because 
the foetus’ accompanying right to life can only be overridden in very specific circumstances: 
what is called justifiable homicide. Kate Greasley states that ‘the clearest example of justified 
homicide recognized in law and in morality is that of killing in self defence’ . Two crucial 25
requirements for justified self defence are necessity and proportionality: it must avert more 
harm than it causes. Clearly, ectogenesis entails there can be no necessity for killing the 
foetus in self defence against bodily intrusion. Although killing the foetus may still be the 
only way to prevent other harms such as the psychological trauma of unwanted parenthood, 
killing to avoid these harms in the event that the foetus has full moral status is clearly 
disproportionate. We conclude that if the foetus is granted full moral status, there can be no 
right to its death.  
 
If the foetus is granted only partial moral status, we cannot assume it possesses a right to life, 
and there ​may​ be sufficient reasons to justify a right to its death in order to benefit humans 
who already possess full moral status, such as avoiding certain harms. This could be 
accomplished by either choosing abortion or killing the foetus once it has been extracted. 
These reasons must be substantial to justify killing a viable human being possessing some 
25 ​Greasley, K. (2017). ​Arguments About Abortion: Personhood, Morality, and Law​. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 59. 
moral status. The absence of a right to life does not imply the foetus can be killed with 
impunity or gratuitously. As Singer and Wells note in response to the claim that the woman 
still has a right in this situation to decide if her foetus lives or dies, ‘it is difficult to see why a 
healthy foetus should die if there is someone who wishes to adopt it and give it the 
opportunity of a worthwhile life’ .  26
 
We will now consider some of these reasons that have been advanced, purporting to justify a 
right to the death of the foetus. Mathison and Davis  have examined three of what they 27
regard to be the most plausible arguments for the right of the death of the foetus, which were 
initially advanced by Overall . Their first argument is the biological parents rights’ 28
argument, and they consider whether certain harms experienced by giving up a child for 
adoption justify the right to the foetus’ death. Mathison and Davis also note that we 
intuitively believe that other biological relatives such as grandparents or siblings do not have 
a right to the death of the foetus, and ask why the parental biological relationship grounds 
such a right only for a specified time, during pregnancy.  
 
Mathison and Davis then consider the right to one’s genetic privacy. They argue that even if 
we grant such a right, at most this applies to one’s entire genome. A child contains only 50% 
of each parent’s genetic material, and it is difficult to see how this is a morally important 
threshold, given close relatives also contain substantial portions of our genetic material. The 
final argument they examine is the right to property, based ’along Lockean lines that we own 
26 Singer, P. and Wells, D. (1984). ​The reproduction revolution: New ways of making babies​. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press,  p. 135. 
27 Mathison & Davis​,​ ​op. cit.​ note 10, pp. 313-320. 
28 ​Overall, ​op. cit.​ note 8, ​p. 131. 
our bodies, and also the fruits of our labour’  – in fact the mixed labour of both parents. 29
Mathison and Davis point out that the labour of others is involved in IVF, such as doctors, 
but they acquire no property rights. They also note that ‘there is no clear place where the 
property claim can be justified’  working back from adult to a foetus. Mathison and Davis 30
conclude that these arguments do not succeed in justifying a right to the death of the foetus, 
and they doubt such a right exists.  
 
Räsänen  has responded to Mathison and Davis, examining each argument and presenting his 31
own case as to why they constitute valid reasons that together ground a right to the death of 
the foetus. We now examine each of Räsänen’s arguments in turn.  
 
THE RIGHT NOT TO BECOME A BIOLOGICAL PARENT  
 
Räsänen’s first argument states there is ‘the right not to become a biological parent’ , 32
echoing Overall’s claim that for women, abortion is ‘acting upon their legitimate 
reproductive right not to become a biological parent’ . Here Räsänen is clear that the term 33
‘biological parent’ refers to a genetic parent. Given that the adults concerned are ​already 
biological parents, we suggest calling this ​the right not to be a biological parent.​ Abortion 
does not stop one becoming a biological parent, rather, it provides a means for the biological 
parents to ​cease​ being one.  
 
29 ​Mathison & Davis, ​op. cit​. note 10, p. 318. 
30 ​Ibid: 319. 
31 ​Räsänen,​ ​op. cit.​ note 6, pp. ​697-702. 
32 Ibid: 698. 
33 ​Overall​, ​op. cit.​ note 9, p. 131. 
Räsänen’s reasoning is that ‘becoming a biological parent causes harm to the couple because 
of parental obligations towards the child’ and in fact that ‘the harms in question are parental 
obligations’ . In his view, parental obligations can never be completely eliminated, even by 34
adoption. Consequently, parents have a right to avoid these harms, and the only way of doing 
so is by ensuring the death of the foetus.  
 
Firstly, we object to Räsänen’s notion that parental obligations are harms. Many parents 
happily fulfill their parental obligations and would deny that this has harmed them. 
Obligations themselves are not harms, although we grant that possessing certain obligations 
may result in harm. It is the nature of some obligations that they may be difficult to satisfy, 
and that doing so may be detrimental to those under obligation, causing them harm. More 
importantly, that certain obligations result in harm does not necessarily justify avoiding those 
obligations. For example, if we make a promise, and we realise that keeping that promise will 
result in harm to us, this does not mean our obligation to keep the promise should be avoided, 
although it could be argued that severe, unexpected harms may mitigate our obligation, 
depending on the circumstances. Of course, it could be argued that abortion is analogous to 
avoiding​ making a promise to take on parental obligations. Räsänen, however, claims that 
‘when a man and woman are having sex, they implicitly accept the possible consequences of 
their activity’ , and he approvingly quotes Rivka Weinberg who states ‘we assume the costs 35
(and rewards) of that risky activity’ . According to Weinberg, however, these costs include 36
incurring parental obligations. The question then becomes, under what circumstances may 
these incurred parental obligations be repudiated by killing the foetus? Given that we grant 
34 Räsänen, ​op. cit.​ note 6, p. 698​. 
35 Ibid: 699. 
36 ​Weinberg, R. (2015). ​The risk of a lifetime: How, when, and why procreation 
may be permissible​. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, p. 67. 
the foetus has some moral status, it would seem that ectogenesis followed by adoption should 
be obligatory, unless the resulting harms are significant.  
 
What harms may parents suffer as a result of relinquishing the foetus to adoption? Both 
Räsänen, and Mathison and Davis cite Cohen’s concept of ‘attributional parenthood’ , a 37
social attitude where genetic parents are treated as though they have the same moral 
obligations as custodial parents, leading to discrimination and negative attitudes from others. 
They also note that a ‘lingering sense of obligation toward the child’ could cause 
psychological harm. There are other possibilities not explored by Räsänen: depending on 
adoption laws, the child may seek contact with its parents some time in the future, and this 
could cause distress . 38
 
Are these potential harms sufficient to justify the death of the foetus instead of utilising 
adoption? What Räsänen seems not to have considered is that the death of the foetus also 
carries the risk of both psychological and societal harm. Some studies have shown that 
abortion may increase the risk of some mental health issues , and if someone may experience 39
a lingering sense of obligation towards a child who has been adopted into another family and 
never seen again, it seems possible they could also feel a similar sense of obligation towards 
a child who might have existed had they not chosen to end its life. Also, in a society where 
37 ​Cohen, I. Glenn​ (2008). The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent? ​Southern California Law Review​, 
81(6), 1115-1196. 
38 ​March, K. (2014). Birth Mother Grief and the Challenge of Adoption Reunion Contact. ​The 
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry​. 84. 409-419. 
39 Fergusson, D. Horwood, L. and Boden, J. (2013). Does abortion reduce the mental health risks of 
unwanted or unintended pregnancy? A re-appraisal of the evidence. ​Australian & New Zealand 
Journal of Psychiatry​, 47(9), 819-827; Coleman, P.K. (2011). Abortion and mental health: 
quantitative synthesis and analysis of research published 1995-2009. ​The British Journal of 
Psychiatry​ 199(3), 180-186. 
ectogenesis is widespread, it seems plausible that there may well be negative social attitudes 
towards those who choose to kill the foetus, especially given the elimination of concerns 
about bodily autonomy. So whether ectogenesis is followed by adoption or the foetus is 
killed, harm could result, and it seems difficult to determine in advance which option would 
be most harmful. It could be argued that a decision to kill the foetus must be made on a case 
by case basis, but this is not a ​right​ to not be a biological parent.  
 
THE RIGHT TO GENETIC PRIVACY 
 
Räsänen claims that ‘if ectogenesis abortions become reality, some women (and men) will 
have genetic children out there who carry their genetic material without their consent. In this 
scenario, their right to genetic privacy has been violated, and the only way to avoid this is if 
they have a right to the death of the foetus’ . To build his case, Räsänen provides a thought 40
experiment of a mad scientist who steals someone’s DNA and gestates a foetus identical to 
them in an artificial womb. Räsänen believes this demonstrates that their right to genetic 
privacy has been violated, and consequently they have a right to the death of the foetus.  
 
Mathison and Davis note that scenarios such as this do not establish a right to genetic 
privacy, but rather point to a right that our genetic information should not be ​misused​. There 
are reasons why we might ​deny​ a right to genetic privacy, or to at least allow it to be 
overridden.  For example, it might be that a spouse has a right to know if their partner has a 
genetic condition that could influence a decision to have children, or that children have a 
40 Räsänen, ​op. cit.​ note 6, p. 699. 
right to know if they are likely to have inherited a disease. Räsänen has not provided 
sufficient grounds for a right to genetic privacy, undermining his argument at the outset.  
 
Let us grant, though, that a right to genetic privacy ​may​ exist and explore what this means 
here. Mathison and Davis claim that the mother’s right to genetic privacy is not violated 
because the foetus only has 50% of her genetic code, raising the question of how much of our 
genetic code must be disclosed for a violation. Is it credible to claim that having children 
violates our right to genetic privacy, implying we must consent to this violation? It cannot be 
that the existence of other close relatives who also share a portion of our genetic code violates 
our genetic privacy, so as Mathison and Davis ask, what is the moral difference when it 
comes to the foetus? This widespread availability of portions of our genetic code seems 
incompatible with a broad right to genetic privacy. It suggests that having children does ​not 
violate any right we have to genetic privacy, and seems to favour our earlier point that the 
right in question is more likely to be ​misuse​ of genetic information rather than privacy.  
 
Räsänen appears to grant Mathison and Davis’s point about the foetus possessing only 50% 
of each parents’ genetic code, stating that ‘this line of reasoning explains only why the 
genetic mother has no right to the death of the fetus’ . He attempts to counter it by arguing 41
that the right to genetic privacy is a ​collective right​. Räsänen states that ‘even though a foetus 
shares 50% of its genetic material with each genetic parent respectively, 100% of the foetus’ 
genetic material comes from its genetic parents’ and so ‘the genetic parents together have a 
right to the death of the fetus’ . However that 100% of the foetus’ genetic material comes 42
from its parents seems irrelevant with respect to genetic privacy: what matters is how much 
41 ​Räsänen, ​op. cit​. note 6, p. 700. 
42 Ibid: 700. 
of the parents’ ​individual​ genetic codes are disclosed. If the disclosure is not sufficient for 
either the mother or father to possess the right to the death of the foetus, then it is not 
sufficient at all. As Peter Jones explains, a requirement of a collective right is that members 
of the group ‘jointly possess a right that none of them possesses individually’ . Rights 43
already held by individuals within the group, such as privacy rights, do not constitute 
collective rights. The right to genetic privacy also fails Jones’ requirement that ‘a right is a 
group right only if it is borne by the group ​qua​ group’ . There is no collective parental 44
genetic code – there is only the genetic code of each individual parent.  
 
It seems that what Räsänen actually means here is that there is a collective right to the death 
of the foetus that is ​grounded​ on the violation of each parent’s genetic privacy.  But this 
raises  a crucial point: if we do grant a right to genetic privacy exists, and even allow that the 
foetus violates this right, how does this entail the parents have the right to the death of the 
foetus? If someone violates our rights in some way, say by stealing from us, we do not 
normally address the violation by killing them. We certainly do not have the ​right​ to kill 
them: violation of a right does not entail the right to kill the violator. Likewise, in the case 
here concerning a viable foetus possessing some moral status, there can be no automatic right 
to its death.  
 
As an aside, it is worth mentioning that references to 50% of each parent’s genetic code being 
shared with the foetus can be misleading. Although the foetus does inherit 50% of its genetic 
code from each parent, this does ​not​ entail 50% of each parent’s genetic code can be 
43 ​Jones, P. (1999). Human Rights, Group Rights, and People's Rights. ​Human Rights Quarterly​, 
21(1), 80–107. 
44 ​Ibid:​ 82. 
recovered​ from the foetus’s genetic code. The foetus’s genetic code is a ​mix​ of its parents’ 
genetic codes, and for most alleles, or gene variants, there is no way of determining which 
parent contributed the allele , and very little of each parents’ genetic code can be obtained. 45
This strengthens our claim that it seems unlikely that the existence of the foetus constitutes a 
violation of a right to genetic privacy, should that right exist.  
 
THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
 
Räsänen’s final argument is that the foetus is the collective property of its parents, and so 
their consent is required for it to be placed in ectogenesis, or alternatively, they can choose to 
destroy it. We agree with Räsänen when he states that ‘obviously, children are not parents’ 
property’ . But we question his reasoning that ‘children are not property because children are 46
persons: morally valuable individuals’ . We also agree that persons cannot be property, but 47
Räsänen has previously defended a threshold view for persons, and argued that infants ‘are 
45 ​There are some exceptions: in ​autosomal recessive inheritance​, if the foetus has both copies of a 
faulty gene, then it is known that each parent must carry at least one copy of the faulty gene, although 
they may just be carriers and unaffected. In ​X-linked inheritance​, if a male foetus has a faulty gene, it 
must have originated in the mother, as fathers cannot pass on X-linked traits. Similarly, in ​Y-linked 
inheritance​, faulty genes can only pass from father to son. Finally, ​mitochondrial inheritance​ applies 
to the 37 genes found in mitochondrial DNA, which is only passed on by females. Mitochondrial 
DNA has a very high mutation rate, estimated as at least an order of magnitude greater than nuclear 
DNA, and so a mutation in a child’s mitochondrial DNA may not be reflected in their mother. See: 
Griffiths, A., et al (2000). ​An Introduction to Genetic Analysis​. 7th edition. New York: W. H. 
Freeman, 41-52, and Tuppen, H., Blakely, E., Turnbull, D. and Taylor, R. (2010). Mitochondrial 
DNA mutations and human disease. ​Biochimica et Biophysica Acta (BBA) - Bioenergetics​, 1797(2), 
113-128. So of perhaps 20,000 genes in the human genome, 37 genes of a mother may be determined 
from their child’s mitochondrial DNA, and in the event that the child has an inherited disorder, there 
is a ​possibility​ that it can be deduced that a parent possesses the same faulty gene (in the case of X- 
and Y-linked disorders). Otherwise, a parent’s genetic code cannot be determined from their child’s, 
unless the other parent’s genetic code is known or their child has an obvious genetic disorder .  
46 ​Räsänen​, ​op. cit​. note 6, p. 701. 
47 Ibid: 701. 
not even close to that threshold’ . With his view that persons cannot be property, does 48
Räsänen mean to imply the converse, that human non-persons ​are​ property? Or are there 
some non-persons such as infants that are also not property? 
 
If it is the former, this would entail under his threshold view of persons that some infants ​are 
property as well as foetuses, and further suggests that if there is a right to the death of a 
foetus, there is likewise a right to the death of the infant – even if it is healthy. As an aside, 
we can further speculate that if infants are property (and not persons), then other morally 
contentious acts may be also be permissible .  49
 
Conversely, if Räsänen believes children of any age, including infants, are not the property of 
their parents, then being a person cannot be the criterion he is using to determine property 
status. In that case, when does the transition from property to non-property status occur? As 
Mathison and Davis point out ‘there is no clear place where the property claim can be 
justified’ . The only realistic candidate seems to be birth itself, i.e. when the foetus begins an 50
existence independent from its mother – the point at which it is no longer referred to as a 
foetus. This becomes problematic in the case of ectogenesis, as it enables the foetus to begin 
an independent existence far earlier, possibly even from conception if combined with in-vitro 
fertilisation (IVF). The point of viability has a similar issue, as it is generally understood to 
be the ability of the foetus to survive outside its mother’s womb, irrespective of supporting 
technology that may be required.  
48 ​Räsänen, J. (2016). Pro-Life Arguments Against Infanticide and Why they are Not Convincing. 
Bioethics​ 30 (9), 656-662, p. 660. 
49 Rodger, D., Blackshaw, B. and Miller, C. ​(2018). Beyond Infanticide: How Psychological Accounts 
of Persons Can Justify Harming Infants. ​The New Bioethics​, 24(2), 106-121. 
50 Mathison & Davis, ​op. cit​. note 10, p. 319. 
 
We note too that IVF blastocysts start from a position of non-independence from their 
mother, and, if transferred, become dependent until birth. This demonstrates what is known 
as an ​episodic​ problem: if used as a criterion, the foetus’s status as property or non-property 
comes and goes depending on its location. A far less problematic conceptual stance is to 
conclude, as do Mathison and Davis, that embryos and foetuses are not the property of their 
parents.  
 
Finally, we note that even if it is granted that the ectogenesis foetus is the property of its 
parents, this does not necessarily entail a right to its death. Räsänen states that it is 
‘commonly believed that people have a right to destroy their property’ , and criticises 51
Mathison and Davis’ example of a historic building that has intrinsic value and cannot be 
destroyed. Historic buildings and pieces of art do not have moral status, and if, as Räsänen 
grants here, the foetus has some moral status, they do not seem comparable. A better 
comparison might be pets, which Mathison and Davis raise but do not elaborate on. We grant 
our pets some degree of moral status, as they are sentient beings, agreeing, for example, they 
should not be subject to suffering without substantial justification. We do not destroy pets if 
they are unwanted and there are people eager to give them a home. Similarly, even if the 




51 Räsänen, ​op. cit​. note 6, p. 701. 
We have established that when ectogenesis is available and developed to a degree where it is 
safe and inexpensive, Thomson’s violinist analogy, which grants that the foetus may possess 
full moral status, does not justify a right to the death of the foetus. The only other argument 
for abortion that grants full moral status is justifiable homicide, and this is untenable if 
ectogenesis is available. We conclude that in the event the foetus is granted full moral status, 
there is no right to the death of the foetus, and abortion is impermissible.  
 
If the foetus is granted partial moral status, it consequently lacks a right to life, and a right to 
its death is easier to justify. However we have examined Räsänen’s arguments for the right to 
the death of the foetus, and have found they are unpersuasive in providing significant reasons 
for grounding such a right. We do not believe there is a right to not be a biological parent, 
even if it could be shown that it is permissible to kill the foetus in certain circumstances. 
Räsänen has not established a right to genetic privacy, and even if this right is granted, the 
existence of the foetus is unlikely to violate this right. If we were to concede that it does, a 
right to its death does not follow. If embryos and foetuses are not the property of their 
parents, as we surmise, they do not have the right to destroy them. We have also noted that 
owning property does not necessarily entail a right to destruction of property. We conclude 
that proponents of the right to the death of the foetus will need to find stronger arguments to 
justify overriding the presumption that a viable human being with at least some moral status 
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